Whereas the extant literature on entry-order e¤ects establishes that …rst entrants often earn higher market shares ("market-share advantage"), the literature on distribution suggests increased distribution has a positive e¤ect on sales. Can distribution help us better understand entry-order e¤ects on market shares? This paper examines how the …rst entrant in a geographical market achieves a market-share advantage through distribution. For this purpose, I propose a simple method of decomposing sales into physical distribution and sales performance. The data come from a manually collected panel on six major Japanese convenience-store chains from 47 geographical markets between 1991 and 2007. Using an instrumental variable approach to deal with the potential endogeneity of entry order, I …nd the market-share advantage for the …rst chain brand is positive. Speci…cally, the physical distribution, measured by the number of outlets in a market, drives most of the advantage. This paper further …nds the density of own outlets is nonmonotonically related (inverted U) to sales performance per outlet, suggesting dynamic outlet expansion faces a trade-o¤ between business-stealing e¤ects within a chain ("cannibalization") and advertising e¤ects through repetition.
Introduction
The extant literature on entry-order e¤ects on performance, typically termed "…rst-mover advantage" or "pioneering advantage," establishes that …rst entrants often earn higher market shares ("market-share advantage;" see, e.g., Kalyanaram, Robinson, and Urban 1995; Lieberman and Montgomery 1988 , 1998 . 1 At the same time, the literature on the e¤ects of marketing mix on performance provides empirical evidence that increased distribution has a positive e¤ect on sales (see, e.g., Ataman, van Heerde, and Mela 2010; Kumar, Fan, Gulati, and Venkat 2009; Reibstein and Farris 1995) . Of course, if a product or service is less accessible because of increased search costs or transportation costs, people might be less likely to purchase it. So, can distribution help us better understand entry-order e¤ects on market shares?
This question is of concern to both academics and marketing practitioners. Consider, for example, chain retailers that aim to grow rapidly in size. Does entering a geographical market earlier than one's competitors lead to higher sales? If so, does this advantage come from increased physical distribution because entering early often leads to a higher number of outlets? Or does this advantage come from higher sales performance per outlet because consumers are more favorable toward earlier entrants'brands?
The purpose of this paper is to take a …rst step toward empirically assessing how a pioneering …rm entering a geographical market might (or might not) achieve a market-share advantage through increased distribution and sales performance per distribution. To quantify the role of distribution separately from sales performance, I propose a simple decomposition of market shares, such that we only need aggregate information on distribution at the market level. Acknowledging that physical outlets in retailing and service industries characterize distribution, this paper decomposes sales into the number of outlets (i.e., stores) and average sales per outlet in a market, both of which are important measures of performance for marketing practitioners and scholars. 23 Because sales from 1 Firms can develop a late-mover advantage, such as technology vintage e¤ects (Bohlmann, Golder, and Mitra 2002) . See Shankar and Carpenter (2012) for a broad review.
2 This outlet share represents the fraction (or percentage) of outlets carrying a chain's brand in a market. Namely, I construct an outlet share for chain i in geographical market m as the number of chain i's outlets in market m divided by the total number of outlets from all chains in market m. Section 2.2 discusses how this measure corresponds to % physical distribution, one of the three major measures of distribution in the literature. 3 For practitioners, outlet counts and sales per outlets are two meaningful measures for gauging performance across chains (Kosová, Lafontaine, and Zhao 2011) . Indeed, marketers treat the magnitude of the per-outlet sales as one of the key yardsticks for measuring the relative performance of a chain compared with other chains in the same market. For scholars, the economic literature on retailing and service has treated the average sales per outlet/unit/establishment as one of the key performance measures for a chain (see, e.g., Caves and Murphy 1976; Martin 1988; Lafontaine 1992) . Also, having two performance metrics would be helpful because the potential mechanisms through which early a market are a product of the number of outlets and average sales per outlet, the decomposition resembles the literature on decomposition of market-share elasticities (Cooper and Nakanishi 1988) and decomposition of sales elasticities into elasticities of category purchase timing, brand choice, and purchase quantity (Gupta 1988; van Heerde, Gupta, and Wittink 2003) . This paper has two key substantive …ndings. First, using an extensive data set containing store counts and sales for 47 geographical markets for the Japanese convenience-store industry between 1991 and 2007, this paper …nds the market-share advantage for …rst entrants is positive and 115:3%, after addressing the potential endogeneity of entry order by utilizing the distance from the largest shareholder company's headquarters as the instrumental variable. Speci…cally, the e¤ects are driven by distribution, measured by the number of outlets in a market: of 115:3%, 101:7% comes directly from higher outlet shares ("outlet-share advantage") for …rst entrants, and the remaining 13:6% comes from better sales performance at the store level ("sales-per-outlet advantage") for …rst entrants. The signi…cant outlet-share advantage for …rst entrants is qualitatively consistent with a strand of literature that argues a multistore incumbent may deter late entrants by credibly preempting a product space through product proliferation (e.g., Prescott and Visscher 1977; Schmalensee 1978; Eaton and Lipsey 1979) in geographical space. On the other hand, this paper …nds the observed sales-per-outlet advantage does not exist with a set of controls for the density of own outlets. This …nding is consistent with the repetition e¤ect, and contrasts with the strand of literature that argues early entrants may permanently bene…t from higher store-level sales performance through various mechanisms, such as prototypicality (e.g., Carpentar and Nakamoto 1989).
Second, this paper investigates the e¤ect of distribution on sales performance, and …nds density of own outlets is nonmonotonically related (inverted U) to average sales per store. The results suggest dynamic outlet expansion is associated not only with entry order, but also with a trade-o¤ between business-stealing e¤ects within a chain ("cannibalization") and the repetition e¤ect. Two cross-sectional survey data sets on consumer perception of chain brands con…rm this interpretation.
To rule out alternative explanations, I use two cross-sectional data sets on outlet-level geographical location to verify whether multistore retailers entering earlier than competitors obtain prime locations.
This paper makes original contributions to the marketing literature in two ways. First, by entrants achieve the market-share advantage are likely to act di¤erently upon these two measures, thereby allowing us to further identify the source(s) of the market-share advantage. See Sections 4.2 and 4.3 for details.
proposing a market-share decomposition, this work quanti…es the entry-order e¤ects on market shares through distribution. Despite the extant empirical literature on the …rst-mover advantage (see, e.g., Table 1 in Lieberman and Montgomery 1998) and the literature on the relationship between market shares and distribution (e.g., Reibstein and Farris 1995; Bucklin, Siddarth, and Silva-Risso 2008; Kumar, Fan, Gulati, and Venkat 2009; Ataman, van Heerde, and Mela 2010) , scant evidence assesses the relative importance of an outlet's sales performance and distribution as mechanisms for …rst-mover advantage. This paper contributes to the marketing literature by synthesizing the existing work on …rst-mover advantage and on the relationship between market shares and distribution through a simple decomposition of market shares. Accordingly, the decomposition yields two substantive …ndings on the sources of the entry-order e¤ects on market shares that are unique in the literature of entry-order e¤ects on performance, namely, (1) a strong role of distribution in market-share advantage and (2) a nonmonotonic relationship between sales performance at the store level and distribution. The …rst …nding corresponds to evidence of the product proliferation for market pioneers (e.g., Robinson and Fornell 1985; Robinson 1988) in the context of geographical space. The managerial implications are potentially signi…cant because practitioners should be aware of the magnitudes of the trade-o¤ between rushing into a new market and increasing its outlet density in existing markets. By entering new markets earlier than its competitors, a …rm may increase the total sales from the market via a higher number of outlets. Alternatively, a …rm may want to develop its existing markets to have a higher density of outlets, which leads to a higher sales performance at the store level. The optimal decision hinges on how many outlets a chain has developed in existing markets because of a nonmonotonic (inverted-U) relationship between density of own outlets and sales per outlet.
Second, this work, by utilizing a unique panel data set, is a rare attempt to investigate the market-share advantage for early entrants in the retailing sector. Although the empirical work on the relationship between entry order and performance is thick, the established evidence, namely, a negative relationship between entry order and market shares, has been mostly on either consumer goods or industrial goods (Kalyanaram, Robinson, and Urban 1995) . Given that retailing is growing in size in the economy in accordance with a decline in manufacturing sectors, the evidence on retailing …rms is surprisingly scarce, and the literature has indeed recognized this topic as one of the key unresolved issues in empirical research. Kalyanaram, Robinson, and Urban (1995) conclude that "research is still needed on pioneer market share advantages for services, retailers, and in emerging markets," echoed by Lieberman and Montgomery (2012) . The two closest papers 4 in this regard are Denstadli, Lines, and Grønhaug (2005) and Michael (2003) . Denstadli, Lines, and Grønhaug (2005) study entry-order e¤ects on consumers' evaluations on prices and quality using survey data in the discount retail grocery industry. Michael (2003) explains the performance di¤erences between restaurants by focusing on years since a …rm adopted a franchising format.
Unlike this study, both approaches lack the interplay between total sales and physical outlets, which characterize the distribution in retailing sectors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this section discusses related literature. Section 2 describes the empirical model of market shares and their decomposition, and presents several theoretical hypotheses that the empirical framework is able to test to examine the sources of market-share advantage (if any). Section 3 describes the data and the convenience-store industry. Section 4 provides empirical results on the …rst entrants' advantage in market shares, and decomposes this advantage into outlet-share and per-outlet-sales advantages. This section also identi…es the potential mechanisms for higher per-outlet sales for the …rst entrant. Section 5 provides discussions of alternative explanations, explores the robustness analysis, and develops the managerial implications. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
This research is related to three strands of literature in marketing. First, this work builds on extensive research on the relationship between order of entry and performance, with a focus on geographic markets. The two closest papers in this regard are Brown and Lattin (1994) and Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dubé (2009) . The former provides empirical evidence of the e¤ect of order of entry on market shares, employing cross-sectional data of two major brands in the pet food market. The latter uses historical entry-order information of 50 geographical markets and a panel data set of 39 months of market shares for the brands in 34 consumer packaged goods (CPG) industries. The authors statistically document entry orders and market shares through the distance from their …rst market of entry, where a "brand" is de…ned as all stock keeping units (SKUs) sold under a given brand name. By including an identity of retailers (i.e., groceries) as a regressor when regressing market shares on a …rst-entrant index, they …nd a retail account component explains 20% of the CPG brands' variation in market shares. This paper documents and investigates the mechanisms of market-share (dis-) advantages at the chain-brand level through decomposition of market shares into outlet shares and per-outlet sales.
Second, this work is related to the strand of literature on order of entry and product prolifer-5 ation. Whereas existing empirical research has focused on how the …rst entrant bene…ts from its proliferation in product space (e.g., Robinson and Fornell 1985; Tellis and Golder 1996; Boulding and Christen 2009) , this work looks at the …rst entrant's market-share advantage in the context of outlet proliferation in geographical space.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on the e¤ects of distribution on performance in sales. Previous empirical research has largely analyzed the performance of brands at the product level. Ataman, van Heerde, and Mela (2010) …nd the positive and signi…cant e¤ects of distribution breadth on sales for 70 brands at the SKU level. Bucklin, Siddarth, and Silva-Risso (2008) report the positive e¤ect of distribution intensity on a consumer's choice of a new car from eight midsize premium sedan models. Kumar, Fan, Gulati, and Venkat (2009) …nd the distribution level has a positive in ‡uence on sales of P&G's 11 brands at the SKU level. By contrast, the empirical evidence of the e¤ect of distribution on sales of brands at the aggregated level, such as the retailer chain, has received scant attention. This paper …lls the gap by evaluating the e¤ect of distribution on brands'market shares at the chain level.
Modeling Approach

Empirical Framework
Market share, outlet share, and sales-per-outlet share. This section begins by revisiting a market share, which is constructed by observed sales for a given chain, market, and time. In addition to sales, suppose we observe the number of outlets for each chain in market m at time t.
Then we can back out the average sales per outlet in market m at time t by dividing sales by the number of outlets. I formalize the model as follows. Consider a market share of a chain that enters a geographical market. By de…nition, the market share of chain i in geographical market m at time t is the sales of chain i in market m at time t divided by the total sales of all outlets in market m in year t. Per Outlet Salesm;t are an outlet share and a per-6 store-sales share, respectively. What do these variables mean? For example, consider a market in which two chains, A and B, exist and have 10 and 30 outlets, respectively. Then the outlet shares of chain A and B will be n A;m;t = 0:25(= 10 40 ) and n B;m;t = 0:75(= 30 40 ), respectively. This outlet share measures chain i's physical distribution in market m. One of the three main measures of distribution in the literature is % physical distribution, namely, percent of outlets carrying the product (Reibstein and Farris 1995) . Because the product is a chain's brand in this paper, one Year i;m;t represents time in market, measured in years since entry into market m at time t for …rm i. " i;m;t is unobserved disturbance, such as a demand shock that a¤ects the sales of the chain. s captures the time-in-market e¤ect, namely, how the absolute duration of …rm i in market m a¤ects its market share, regardless of the timing of entry relative to other competitors (e.g., Urban et al. 7 1986; Brown and Lattin 1994; Hu¤ and Robinson 1994) . 4 Lastly, X i;m;t is a combination of other controls, such as chain-brand …xed e¤ects, market …xed e¤ects, and an intercept. I construct regression equations of ln n i;m;t and ln v i;m;t on the same controls used in Equation
Namely
(1). Namely, ln n i;m;t = n f irst First Entrant i;m + n ln(Year i;m;t ) + n X i;m;t + " n i;m;t (2)
Decomposition of Equation (1) similar to the sales-elasticity decomposition with respect to marketing mix (Cooper and Nakanishi 1988) reveals that in the population model, the sum of the parameters from these two separate equations is equal to the corresponding parameters of the market-share equation. Namely,
and s = n + v and s = n + v (see Appendix B-1, B-2, and B-3). This relationship enables a researcher to assess how much of a chain's higher market share over rival chains comes from the outstanding distribution, re ‡ected in the number of outlets ("outlet-share advantage"), or from the superior sales at the individual store level relative to the market average ("sales-per-outlet advantage").
Per-outlet-sales regressions. The decomposition leads to an empirical question regarding whether the …rst entrants tend to earn higher performance at the store level, such as sales per outlet, which is unique in the literature of estimating entry-order e¤ects on market shares. On one hand, Klemperer (1987) argues if consumers may incur substantial costs when they switch to buying other products from competitors, consumers show brand loyalty even when products are ex-ante functionally homogeneous. Early entrants may permanently enjoy higher performance than later entrants by deterring their entry. On the other hand, a strand of behavioral marketing research suggest the repetition of exposures, not entry order per se, a¤ects consumers' purchase intention ("repetition e¤ects"). We therefore include several controls regarding variables that relate to the repetition of purchase-density of own-chain brand's and competitors'outlets. 
where (Outlet Density) i;m;t is the outlet density of own chain, de…ned as the number of chain i's outlets at time t in market m divided by the population in that market, and (Outlet Density) i;m;t is the outlet density of competitor chains, de…ned as the number of chain i's competitor chains' outlets at time t in market m divided by the population in that market. To allow for the presence of a non-linear relationship between the density of own outlets and the sales per outlet, which I detail in Hypotheses 3 and 4 in the next theory subsection, the speci…cation has a squared term.
I now turn to theoretical hypotheses that the empirical framework is able to test to assess the sources of market-share, outlet-share, and sales-per-outlet advantage (if any).
Theoretical Framework
This section develops …ve hypotheses to guide the empirical analysis. Speci…cally, based on the previous research that has proposed various mechanisms to explain the …rst entrant's higher (or lower) performance (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988) , this section examines several models that may have di¤erent predictions on how entry order a¤ects market shares and their components:
outlet shares and sales per outlet.
Market-share advantage for the …rst entrant. The extant literature on entry-order e¤ects has largely con…rmed the market-share advantage in the long run for early entrants (e.g., Robinson and Fornell 1985; Urban et al. 1986 ), although some provided opposite evidence on the e¤ects of order of entry on market shares (e.g., Golder and Tellis 1993) . Schmalensee (1982) further suggests this …rst-entrant advantage is larger for convenience goods. I therefore formulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): All else being equal, the …rst entrant tends to have a higher market share than that of non-…rst entrants ( s f irst > 0). Similarly, a negative relationship exists between entry order and market shares ( s order < 0).
Outlet-share advantage via outlet proliferation. How do theory models predict the entry-order e¤ects on number of outlets? Two distinct predictions exist. First, a strand of theoretical literature argues an incumbent may deter late entrants by credibly preempting a product space through product proliferation, such as increasing the number of outlets in a geographical location. A model of sequential-move games predicts that in a subgame perfect equilibrium, the "leader," or the …rst entrant, produces a larger quantity and obtains a higher payo¤ than the followers (Stackelberg 1934) . In the context of spatial competition, Prescott and Visscher (1977) , Schmalensee (1978) , Eaton and Lipsey (1979) , and Bonanno (1987) echo this conclusion. For instance, a monopolist may deter entry through relocation of outlets or an increase in the number of outlets (Bonanno 1987) . Overall, many variants of the leader-and-follower model in this direction,
including Peng and Tabuchi (2007) , predict the early entrant is likely to obtain a higher number of outlets than later entrants. A supply-side mechanism, such as economies of density-additional cost savings through logistics from having su¢ cient density in a market (see, e.g., Jia 2008; Holmes 2011; Nishida 2015)-may provide an alternative perspective on outlet-share advantage for early entrants.
By contrast, another strand of literature predicts the sequential move by players may not allow the incumbents to proliferate outlets. For instance, unless the incumbent's exit costs are not too high, entry deterrence against new entrants through product proliferation may not be credible for incumbents (Judd 1985) . Moreover, if each …rm increases the number of outlets over time at an approximately similar speed, even a simpler model with no strategic interactions would predict a spurious negative correlation emerges between order of entry and number of outlets. The order of entry would then not be associated with the outlet share, after controlling for the duration of …rms in a given market. These two strands of literature lead to the testing of the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): All else being equal, the …rst entrant tends to have a higher outlet share than those of non-…rst entrants ( n f irst > 0). Similarly, a negative relationship exists between entry order and outlet shares ( n order < 0).
Sales-per-outlet advantage via repetition e¤ect, prototypicality, and prime location.
How do theory models explain the entry-order e¤ects on individual store performance, such as sales per outlet? Three major explanations-repetition e¤ect, prototypicality, and prime location-are available, and I discuss them in order. First, the behavioral marketing research suggests two competing hypotheses for whether and why entry order may have a signi…cant positive impact on consumers' preferences. On one hand, a strand of literature argues the repetition of exposures a¤ects consumers'attitude and purchase intentions ("repetition e¤ect"). A typical …nding is that purchase intentions are nonmonotonically related (inverted U) to repetition (see, e.g., Batra and Ray 1986) . This mechanism would predict the sales per store would be nonmonotonically related to the density of own outlets (i.e., number of own outlets per population) in the market, but not to the entry order. Namely, increased "visibility"of a chain brand through a higher density of own outlets initially increases the probability of consumers purchasing from the chain brand's outlets, but the marginal e¤ect of this repetition e¤ect starts to level o¤ after a certain level of the density of outlets. On the other hand, another strand of literature argues an entry order permanently a¤ects consumers' preferences. Carpenter and Nakamoto (1989) show in the laboratory setting that early entrants set the standard for the individual's preference for a set of particular items, thereby shifting the preferences to favor the product that an early entrant produces, and yielding a higher market share in the long run. This mechanism would predict the sales per store would be permanently higher for the …rst entrant, after controlling for several factors, including density of own outlets, because a particular chain brand would preempt a consumer's perceptual space. Similarly, Kardes et al. (1993) provide experimental evidence that entry order a¤ects consumer learning and judgment, leading to a pioneering advantage that later entrants will have di¢ culty overcoming with the same level of advertising. Alpert and Kamins (1995) , using a survey-based approach, …nd support for the persistent advantage for early entrants through more favorable perceptions for pioneering brands than non-pioneering brands. In either case, a pioneer chain brand may preempt a consumer's perceptual space, thereby leading to higher average store sales for the …rst entrant, ceteris paribus. Note that a strand of literature argues how brand loyalty extends to chain loyalty.
For instance, Carman (1970) reports a positive correlation between chain loyalty and brand loyalty.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): All else being equal, the …rst entrant does not have higher sales per outlet than those of non-…rst entrants, when controlling for the density of own outlets in the market ( sales l ; l 2 ff irst; orderg, is not statistically signi…cant at the 5% level).
Because an outlet of a chain competes with other outlets of the same chain and rival chains, I expect the density of own outlets and other chains'outlet in a market to a¤ect the sales per outlet through competition among outlets ("business-stealing e¤ect"). Combined with the aforementioned possibility of nonlinearity in the repetition e¤ect, we would expect the sales per outlet may increase in the number of own outlets when the number is low, because the repetition e¤ect, which is positive in the wear-in phase, dominates the negative competition e¤ect. However, as the number increases, sales per outlet start to decrease in the density of own outlets, because (1) the negative competition e¤ect increases and (2) the repetition e¤ect eventually levels o¤.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): All else being equal, the sales per outlet increase in the density of own outlets when the density is low, but eventually decrease in the density when the density of own outlets is high ( own 1 > 0 and own 2 < 0).
Finally, this paper examines an alternative explanation for higher sales per outlet for …rst entrants. The …rst entrant may be able to preempt scarce assets, such as prime retailing location (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988) . Using land prices as the proxy for the attractiveness of a location, and denoting the parameter for this proxy in the regression equation as location , we have the following hypothesis: With all …ve hypotheses, the empirical questions concern whether the actual data would be consistent with those theoretical predictions. I now turn to the description of the industry and data sets.
Industry and Data
The convenience-store industry in Japan. The convenience-store industry has been expanding successfully in many countries. For instance, 7-Eleven, which started its business in 1927
in Dallas, Texas, has become the world's largest convenience-store chain, operating in more than 16 countries with more than 44; 700 outlets in 2012. The current parent company is Seven & i Holdings Co., Ltd in Japan. The total number of 7-Eleven stores in the world exceeds the number of Wal-Mart stores or McDonald's by approximately 34; 000 and 11; 000, respectively. Despite the convenience stores'presence in retailing, little research has analyzed the industry.
Since the mid-1970s, the major convenience-store chains in Japan, such as 7-Eleven, LAWSON, and Family Mart, started this new business category as subsidiary companies of nation-wide supermarket and hypermarket chains that had di¢ culty expanding due to a regulation enacted in 1973 to discourage the entry by large-scale retailers. Since then, these major convenience-store chains have expanded their businesses enormously, and independent (or non-chain a¢ liated) convenience stores have emerged as fringe …rms within the industry. The business category has been expanding and the failures of the convenience-store chains are quite limited in Japan during the data period. The store density (i.e., number of stores per population) has become tremendously high in most areas as described below, and they o¤er a wide range of products and services, including lunchboxes, soft drinks, alcohol, cosmetics, books and magazines, ATMs, ticket reservations, bill payments, delivery services, and so on. Appendix C covers more detailed descriptions of the data and the industry's history and features.
[Insert Table 1 around here] [Insert Figure 1 around here] Figure 1 presents the market shares by prefectures for 7-Eleven (left) and LAWSON (right).
Together with Figure 2 in Section 4.1, Figure 1 illustrates that the market shares in the prefectures each chain entered as the …rst entrant indeed tend to be the highest among all chains. These two …gures suggest a negative correlation between entry order and the market shares, which I investigate in the next section.
The six major chains are similar in terms of store size in ‡oor space, number of store-keeping units (SKUs) in a store, services, and pricing. Appendix C presents the evidence of this similarity, and (780). Second, outlets in Japan have more items than outlets in the United States.
The average store's ‡oor space in Japan is around 1; 743ft 2 , which is smaller than the average space in the United States (2; 800ft 2 ). However, the number of SKUs a typical Japanese store carries is over 3; 000, which is larger than that of a typical convenience store in the United States. Each convenience-store chain in Japan strives to increase the fraction of sales from its unique privatelabel products of food and drinks against the national-brand products, such as Coca-Cola, and the fraction reached 55% of total sales for 7-Eleven Japan in 2007. 7
Dependent variables. I employ various sources to construct the dependent variables, such as market shares, outlet shares, and sales per outlet. The primary source of market-share data is the annual …nancial statements from the six largest convenience-store chains, which provide the prefecture-level annual sales and the number of stores for each chain. The coverage ranges from 1991 through 2007, and the data are an unbalanced panel, because several markets exist in which certain chains have not entered. These sales at the prefecture level serve as the numerator when calculating a particular chain's market share in a given prefecture. I de ‡ate the nominal sales across years by using the Consumer Price Index from the Cabinet O¢ ce. The Census of Commerce from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry provides the prefecture-level aggregate sales and store counts of all convenience stores, including regional chain and non-chain independent outlets, for the years 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2007 14 not have a breakdown by chains, and they serve as the denominator when calculating the market share or outlet share of a particular chain. Japan has 47 prefectures, and each is a governmental body with a governor. This paper treats these prefectures as 47 independent geographic markets in the market-share regressions.
Spillovers across markets either in demand or costs or both may make observations nonindependently. For instance, people may travel across the boundary of prefectures (demand), and a distribution center may serve stores in di¤erent prefectures (costs). The spillover e¤ects on the demand side might not pose an immediate concern for this industry, because the demand for a convenience store is typically con…ned within a 2; 000-meter radius. Appendix F explores the main speci…cation's robustness checks to include the density of outlets in adjacent markets. The results do not …nd evidence of dependence of markets in sales.
In addition to sales and store counts, I use consumers' brand-loyalty data from two distinct if multiple chains enter a market in the same year, these chains'entry order will be the same.
[Insert Table 2 around here] been the fourth entrant at the latest in every prefecture, the largest chain, 7-Eleven, is the …fth or sixth entrant in 10 prefectures, and still has eight prefectures with no outlet. Furthermore, the table shows 7-Eleven was the …rst entrant less than 30% of the time in Japan (i.e., in 14 markets out of 47 markets). This entry-order information is at the market level, and I do not have store-level information on the entry timing for a given market.
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Empirical Evidence of First Entrant' s Advantage
This paper's empirical investigation begins with formally establishing the (non-) existence of marketshare advantage for the …rst entrant. This paper then decomposes the observed market-share advantage for the …rst entrant into the outlet-share and per-outlet-sales advantages.
E¤ects of Entry Order on Market Shares
This subsection examines the entry-order e¤ects on market shares (H1) using the empirical speci-…cation outlined in Equation (1).
Addressing endogeneity of entry order. A typical concern when estimating entry-order e¤ects on market shares is that entry timing may be potentially endogenous. For instance, chains that enter a geographical market earlier than competitors are systematically di¤erent from latermover chains, such that the parameters on an entry-order variable does not necessarily measure the entry-order e¤ects on market shares, but rather some other factors about type at the chain level and chain-market level.
To see this endogeneity problem in this work's speci…c context, consider, for instance, esti-mating Equation (1) through the ordinary least squares (OLS). OLS would treat the regressors, including entry-order indicators, First Entrant i;m or Entry Order i;m , as exogenously given. Chains may, however, deliberately choose the entry timing and which market to enter, depending on unobservables in the market that a¤ect sales, such as a demand shock at the chain-market level. For example, if a chain anticipates consumers'market-chain-speci…c taste or goodwill over the chain's brand that would positively a¤ect chain i's sales in that market m, such as a potential good match between chain i's horizontal di¤erentiation in products and the market-speci…c taste, the chain may choose to enter market m earlier than the case in which a chain receives a negative demand shock.
Because the entry-order indicator is no longer independent of the error term, the coe¢ cient on the endogenous variable may be biased and inconsistent.
This paper addresses the endogeneity issue in the following two ways. First, because the data are panel, I include chain-brand …xed e¤ects in all speci…cations to control for the unobserved chain-brand type. In addition, Table 2 con…rms that order of entry varies across markets for all chains, suggesting that no particular chain dominantly behaves as the …rst entrant. Second, to control for the endogeneity at the chain-market level, this paper utilizes an instrument variable (IV) that a¤ects a chain's entry-timing decisions but does not a¤ect unobservables, following the IV approach taken by Moore, Boulding, and Goodstein (1991) , Boulding and Staelin (1993) , and Boulding and Christensen (2003) . Because the dependent variable is sales (market share), ideally we would like to have a cost shifter (hence a¤ecting the entry-timing decision) that varies across chains and market. Given the availability of multiple geographical markets, I exploit the distance to the headquarters of the largest shareholding company for each convenience-store chain as the instrument for this paper. The use of this instrument is related in spirit to Neumark, Zhang, and Ciccarella (2008) , Jia (2008) , and Zhu and Singh (2009) , who utilize the geographical distance to the headquarters of the …rm as an instrument or exclusion restriction.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
I now discuss the three conditions for the validity of instruments and how this instrument is likely to work for the convenience-store industry in Japan. The …rst condition is that the instrument needs to be correlated with the endogenous variable that is instrumented, conditioning on other exogenous variables, and this paper presents three reasons why the instrument is related to the order of entry. First, several studies in the franchising literature con…rm the distance from the monitoring headquarters is related to the measure of the control/behavioral monitoring costs. The idea behind the correlation is that the cost of sending a company employee to monitor the outlet in a given market may increase as the distance to the market from the headquarter increases (see, e.g., Brickley and Dark 1987; Minkler 1990) . Second, given the industry's institutional background, the distance from the headquarters of the shareholding company is likely to a¤ect the behavior of its subsidiary company in the convenience-store industry in Japan. Six di¤erent major retail chains initially developed and owned all six of these convenience-store chains in Japan in the late 1970s and early 80s. For instance, Table 4 illustrates that the largest shareholder of 7-Eleven in 1974 was Ito-Yokado Co., Ltd., which was a general-merchandise-store chain. Similarly, the largest shareholder of LAWSON in 1975 was The Daiei Inc., which was one of the largest supermarket chains in Japan.
Finally, this paper indeed observes a correlation between the instrument and order of entry. Figures   2a and 2b illustrate the distance to the shareholding company's headquarters negatively correlates with the entry order (and thus the geographical roll-out decisions) for the largest and the second largest chains, respectively, and we …nd similar patterns for the rest of the chains. Figure 2a . Figure 2b .
The second condition is that an instrument needs to be uncorrelated with unobservables in the market-share and sales-per-outlet regression equations. The industry is likely to satisfy this exclusion restriction for two reasons. First, as I discussed in the previous paragraph, the instrument, the distance to the headquarters of the largest shareholding company for each convenience-store chain, is a cost shifter, and thus unlikely to be correlated with the unobserved demand shocks in Equation (1), because market-share variables are based on sales. Second, because sales are driven mostly by demand-side factors, we are particularly concerned with whether any unobserved demand shifters, such as consumers'market-brand-speci…c taste or goodwill over the chain's brand, are related to the largest shareholder company's brand name (hence location). The instrument and a demand shock are likely to be uncorrelated when consumers shopping at a convenience-store chain do not recognize the store's shareholder chain brand or company name. The non-correlation is plausible in our study, in which, for two reasons, not many consumers notice the a¢ liations between convenience-store chain brands and the largest shareholder's retail chain brand or company name. The …rst reason is that these shareholding retail companies and convenience-store chains are operated separately, and their brands were never jointly advertised. The second reason is that the business category is di¤erent (i.e., convenience-store industry vs. supermarket, general merchandise, or trading industry), so consumers are unlikely to have the opportunity to associate these chain brands of the shareholding company with the convenience-store chain. Note that if we were regressing pro…ts, which are revenue minus costs, instead of market shares, we would have a much more serious concern with the use of this instrument, because it is likely to be correlated with the cost shocks in the regression equations.
Finally, because entry timing di¤ers across chain brands, we have the third condition that the instrument needs to provide independent variations across …rms within the same market-year observations. The proposed instrument creates a variation across convenience-store chains' entry orders within a given market, because the locations of the headquarters of the largest shareholder companies di¤er across these six convenience-store chains. The instrument provides some variations across time, because ownership turnovers exist for all chains (Table 4) . Table 5 around here]
Estimation results. [Insert
Columns 1 through 6 in Table 5 report the results from the IV regressions of market shares, outlet shares, and per-store-outlet shares on the …rst-entrant indicator and other controls. All spec-i…cations include the market …xed e¤ects and chain-brand …xed e¤ects, in which we use ministop, a chain brand, as the reference group for chain-brand …xed e¤ects. By including the chain-brand …xed e¤ects, I control for any systematic di¤erences in the dependent variables across chains that are constant over time, such as the chain-level heterogeneity in the store size, pricing, product quality, brand equity, and depth of product assortment. Given the panel-data structure, I cluster the standard errors on the panel identi…er (a market-chain combination), which imposes no restrictions on the variance matrix over time for a given panel identi…er, including serial correlation.
Column 1 presents instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the …rst-entrant e¤ects on market
shares, s f irst . The results presented in column 1 document the …rst entrant obtains a higher market share than later entrants by a wide margin. Similarly, column 4 shows a negative relationship between entry order and market shares. The sign on the …rst-entrant indicator variable and entryorder variable is statistically signi…cant at the 5% level and 1% level, respectively. A separately run one-sided test yields the probability of rejecting H1's null hypothesis H0: s f irst 0 when H0 is true as 0:008, and this value is below the 5% signi…cance level, which I use as the critical value for rejecting hypotheses throughout the paper. Although the magnitudes of the …rst entrant may seem somewhat large (^ s f irst = 115:3% increase), these parameter coe¢ cients are relative to the market share of the base category (non-…rst entrants). For instance, consider an example in which each non-…rst entrant has a market share of 20%. Applying the frequently used linear approximation, the …rst-entrant parameter estimates in column 1 imply that all else being equal (i.e., chain brands and number of years), the market share of the …rst entrant would be 43:1%(= 20% (1 + 1:153)).
Meanwhile, the coe¢ cient on the 7-Eleven-brand …xed e¤ect is 1:129, implying the leading chain brand in Japan, 7-Eleven, from the ministop chain brand (base category) would have the market share of 42:6%(= 20% (1 + 1:129) ) if ministop has a market share of 20%, all else being equal.
Although not shown in the table, the results are robust to the exclusion of time in market.
Several tests are available to examine the performance of the instrument. The statistic proposed for testing for underidenti…cation is 27:658, implying the rejection of the null hypothesis that the estimation equation is underidenti…ed. The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) Wald rk F statistic is 40:946, rejecting the hypothesis that the instrument has a weak identi…cation problem. The endogeneity test statistics yield the p-values of 0:003, rejecting the null hypothesis that the indicator variable for the …rst entrant can be treated as exogenous in the estimation equation. Given these results, this paper does not …nd major issues with this instrument.
Overall, we con…rm the presence of a market-share advantage (H1). A natural question would be which mechanisms drive this market-share advantage for …rst entrants, which I explore in the next subsection.
Decomposing Market-Share Advantage into Outlet-Share and Per-Outlet-
Sales-Share Advantages
This subsection focuses on the role of distribution and sales performance by decomposing market shares into outlet shares and per-outlet-sales shares.
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Columns 1 through 3 in Table 5 present the decomposition results. Columns 2 and 3 use the log outlet share and log per-outlet share as the dependent variable, respectively. As Equation (3) shows, the regression coe¢ cients of a given regressor in columns 2 and 3 add up to the coe¢ cient of the corresponding variable in column 1.
The second and third columns in Table 5 show the …rst-entrant e¤ect on outlet share and perstore-sales share, n f irst and v f irst , is positive and statistically signi…cant at the 5% and 1% levels. A separately run one-sided test rejects H2's null hypothesis at the 5% signi…cance level. These two With regard to the hypothesis on the …rst entrant's advantage in developing the number of outlets (H2), both the coe¢ cients on the …rst-entrant indicator variable and entry-order variable in columns 2 ( n f irst ) and 5 ( n order ) suggest the data favor the preemption of market demand via sequential quantity competition with credible commitment. This result is qualitatively consistent with the characteristics of the industry: the entry-timing decisions are made over a long period of time, such as decades, which allows each chain-before making a decision-to observe and react to other chains'decisions on entry timing and number of outlets. Moreover, the costs of relocating or closing an outlet within a market are sizeable. Annual …nancial statements reveal a chain incurs costs of approximately US$100,000 on average for closing one of its stores. Given these industry features, we should probably not be surprised to see that sequential-move games with high exit costs provide a more realistic description of order of entry and number of outlets than sequential-move games with low or no exit costs, or Cournot's simultaneous-move game with complete information.
Investigating Per-Outlet-Sales Advantage
Entry-order e¤ects on individual store' s performance. I now turn to the …nding that the …rst entrant achieves by a nontrivial margin (^ v f irst = 13:6%) a higher sales-per-outlet share. Several theoretical models and pieces of anecdotal evidence suggest the density of own and rival outlets a¤ect per-outlet sales through competition and advertising. To investigate how the density of outlets a¤ects the per-outlet performance in detail, I estimate Equation (4).
[Insert Table 6 around here]
Column 1 in Table 6 presents the results from the full speci…cation. This table indicates the entry-order e¤ect on per-store sales is non-existent with a control for the outlet density, whereas the density of outlets (own and rival), which accounts for competition and advertising, seems to drive the permanent sales-per-outlet increase. Speci…cally, the e¤ect of the …rst-entrant indicator does not seem to directly a¤ect the sales per outlet. Meanwhile, the density of own outlets enters positively when the density is low. This result is qualitatively consistent with H3. Given the …rst entrant attains a higher number of own outlets (H2), it may achieve the higher individual store sales through the density of own stores. The empirical …nding is robust across speci…cations that either use the historical entry order or exclude market …xed e¤ects and/or years since entry.
Another pattern that emerges from the estimation is the inverted-U relationship between the number of own outlets and the sales per store (^ own 1 > 0 and^ own 2 < 0), as expected according to H4. I reject the null joint hypothesis at the 5% signi…cance level.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
To understand how this nonlinearity appears, Figure 3 plots the prediction of the own density e¤ect on the sales per outlet implied by the estimated parameters in column 1 in Table 6 . This …gure shows the individual store performance in sales improves in the number of own outlets when the density is low, but eventually the sales per outlet start to decrease after the density of own outlets exceeds a certain threshold. The maximum is attained at a density of 0:108 outlets per 1; 000 people, and the e¤ect will be negative at a density of 0:215. Given the maximum density of own outlets in the data is around 0:165, chains seem not to develop outlets in the region of the negative e¤ect. This nonlinearity is qualitatively consistent with the dynamics of the trade-o¤ between the repetition e¤ect and the cannibalization e¤ect, both of which are driven by own density. Namely, the repetition e¤ect through exposure may be dominating the cannibalization e¤ect when the density of own outlets is at its low level, because the repetition e¤ect is high 22 when the repetition is low. The increase in the density of own outlets helps the …rm increase the individual store performance, because the chain brand is more advertised through increased repeated purchases because of a denser network of outlets. However, the cannibalization e¤ect increases as the own density increases, and eventually it dominates the repetition e¤ect because the marginal e¤ect of the repetition e¤ect might level o¤, whereas the marginal e¤ect of cannibalization might not. Meanwhile, the density of competitors'outlets decreases the per-outlet sales signi…cantly because of business-stealing e¤ects. In summary, the order of entry only a¤ects the sales per outlet through distribution. Entering the market earlier than rivals helps the chain because the …rst entrant is likely to face a smaller business-stealing e¤ect from competitors, which monotonically increases in the density of rival outlets. Because all chains provide similar services and products, not observing positive spillover e¤ects across chains because of clustering is natural in this industry, unlike shopping malls. The above results do not change either qualitatively or quantitatively, after I include the log number of supermarkets in the market as a regressor.
Overall, the results (H2) support the preemption of geographical space with outlet proliferation and the repetition e¤ect through outlet developments. The sole results may not be convincing, however, because the results above do not eliminate other explanations, such as prime location for the …rst entrant. To address these issues, the next section employs two additional cross-sectional data: the supplemental surveys and outlet-level location.
Discussions
The …rst two subsections supplement the previous section's …ndings with evidence from the brandpreference surveys and outlet-level location data.
Verifying the repetition e¤ect with survey data. This subsection examines whether the development of brand loyalty through density of outlets indeed drives the …ndings in the previous section (H3). I supplement the market-level aggregate data with two cross-sectional surveys. These surveys contain information on geographical variations in the degree of consumers' brand loyalty to a particular chain brand. 8
For this purpose, I regress the log fraction of consumers who vote for one of the conveniencestore chains on the …rst-entrant indicator and other controls. I denote the parameter on the …rst-entrant indicator and entry-order variable as brand f irst and brand order , respectively. I use two distinct cross-sectional surveys, one from 2005 and the other from 2010. Because these surveys publish the consumers' responses aggregated at the regional level, I changed the right-hand-side variable accordingly. For instance, the …rst-entrant indicator is the average of the …rst-entrant indices across prefectures within a given region. The …rst two columns show the results from the 2005 survey, and the next two columns show the results from the 2010 survey. Note that 10 regions exist in Japan, where a region is a unit of an administrative district, and each has one to eight prefectures.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
Columns 1 through 8 in Table 7 show the density of own outlets drives a statistically and economically signi…cant return from being the …rst entrant on the brand preference. For instance, column 4 implies that after taking into account the number of years and outlet density, the …rst entrant obtains 4 points more on average than non-…rst entrants on a scale of 0 100 points, which is, however, not precisely estimated even at the 10% level, all else being equal. In other words, the density of own outlets is strongly associated with brand preference, qualitatively consistent with the results from Table 6 . The above results are robust to the use of an historical entry variable or the exclusion of region and chain-brand …xed e¤ects.
Overall, the results suggest the entry order might a¤ect the preference for a chain's brand through the density of the chain's outlets. The next subsection considers whether the location preemption may explain the per-outlet-sales advantage for the …rst entrant.
Alternative explanation: preemption of prime physical location. This subsection examines whether the …rst entrant is successful in achieving a higher market share by obtaining physical resources, such as good locations (H5). When taking the cost side into account, such as cost of space, the predictions on the pro…tability per store for the …rst entrant may not be as obvious as the sales per store, because better locations with larger sales may su¤er from increased costs. To investigate whether the …rst entrant tends to achieve a "better"or attractive location as measured by a higher land price in the neighborhood, I complement the market-level information on entry brand items, too. For instance, any outlet would carry Coke and other popular soft-drink brands, and consumers would choose the geographically closest outlet from their location. The e¤ect of brand loyalty or switching costs on purchasing decisions may not be as clear in the retailing industry as in other industries, such as the consumer packaged-goods industry. order with geographical location for all convenience stores in Japan in 2001. To assess whether the data support H5, I use several measures of the attractiveness of retail location with publicly available location data. These variables include nighttime population, number of workers, number of households, and the land price in 2001. The unit of analysis is an outlet. For a given convenience store, I construct population, number of workers, and number of households from demographics of the 1km 2 mesh grid in which the outlet falls. I also use population at the census block in which the outlet is located. For land price, I use the closest price point from the outlet's location. The population from the census block is normalized by the geographical size of the census block, because each census block has a di¤erent geographical area. To associate these outlet-level demographics with the market-level entry-order information, I average these demographic variables across outlets of the same chain in a given prefecture. I denote the parameter on the …rst-entrant indicator as location f irst :
[Insert Table 8 around here] Table 8 presents the results of regressing the above demographic variables at the chain-market level on the …rst-entrant indicator or entry-order variable and other controls, including chain-brand and market …xed e¤ects, to account for di¤erences across markets and chains. Columns 1 and 3 use the log nighttime population as the dependent variable as a proxy for attractiveness of outlet location. The estimated magnitude of coe¢ cients on …rst entrant is positive, but most of these coe¢ cients are not precisely estimated at the 5% level. The same pattern applies to the speci…cations in column 5, 7, and 9, in which we use the log number of households, log number of workers, and log land price, respectively, as the measures of location attractiveness. The above results are robust to the use of an historical entry variable, although the evidence is a bit stronger than that of the indicator-variable speci…cations.
Overall, no evident pattern emerges from these regressions regarding how entry order is associated with attractiveness of outlets'location.
Robustness checks. To see how the results are sensitive to the speci…cations, I conduct eight robustness checks. First, Appendix D examines whether the results are robust to an unbalanced versus balanced panel structure. The results in Table A4 yield the magnitude of market-share and other advantages quantitatively similar to the baseline results in Table 5 . Second, Table A7 uses an alternative density measure, which is the number of outlets in level, to verify the robustness of the measures for the presence of outlets in the same market. The results yield a non-linear relationship between the number of own outlets and sales per outlet, similar to Table 6 . Third, Appendix E examines the strategic choice of spatial outlet location, another potential mechanism for the peroutlet-sales advantage for early entrants. I focus on whether the …rst entrant locates its outlets close to or distant from other outlets of own chain or rival chains. Using cross-sectional location data, I …nd no evidence of entry orders a¤ecting strategic location choice. Fourth, Appendix F examines whether the presence of own and competitors' chains in adjacent markets poses a concern about dependency among 47 markets. The results con…rm that the presence of outlets in neighboring markets has little e¤ect on sales. Fifth, the current operationalization with a single variable regarding entry order may yield the very large estimated e¤ect. The limitation is that the baseline speci…cations have to be restricted to one variable on entry order, because we only have one available instrument, such that the entry-order e¤ects will be under-identi…ed when we have more entry-order indices. To examine this concern, I jointly investigate the e¤ects on the …rst, second, third, fourth, and …fth entrants, using standard …xed-e¤ect regressions without using instruments.
The results in Appendix G show the entry-order e¤ects are diminishing in entry order, but these entry-order e¤ects go away once we control for the outlet density, con…rming the baseline results
in Tables 5 and 6 . Sixth, Appendix H con…rms the robustness of the results to more aggregated data, such as regional and national-level observations. Seventh, to investigate how contingency factors a¤ect the magnitudes of entry-order e¤ects, I enrich the speci…cations in Tables 5 and 6 by including a market growth rate as a marketplace variable (Appendix I). Finally, to see how the results in Table 6 are sensitive to the choice of instrument, Table A8 utilizes both OLS and instrumental variable approach with the distance to the …rst store of the convenience-store chain as an alternative instrument. Both results con…rm the …ndings from Managerial implications. Because two actionable levers for chains in this study are entryorder decisions and outlet-density decisions, the results in this paper o¤er rich managerial implications to managers in at least two ways. First, this paper shows and quanti…es a trade-o¤ between new markets and existing markets. One of the major managerial implications from marketers' viewpoint is that according to the results from Tables 5 and 6 , when expanding a certain number of outlets, a chain is able to decide whether to prioritize rushing into a new market over increasing its outlet density in existing markets. By entering new markets earlier than its competitors, a …rm may obtain a substantial …rst-mover advantage in outlet share, which increases the total sales from the market via a higher number of outlets. Alternatively, a …rm may want to develop its existing markets to have a higher density of outlets, which leads to a higher sales performance at the store level and thus higher total sales. The optimal decision hinges on how many outlets a chain has developed in existing markets, because the results from Table 6 suggest that due to a nonmonotonic (inverted-U) relationship between density of own outlets and sales per outlet, the marginal bene…t from increasing the store density is decreasing in its density. Namely, when the store density is at a low range, a chain may want to exploit the advertising e¤ect through repetition to increase the individual store performance in sales. To do so, a chain would increase the store density in existing markets rather than rush to enter a new market earlier than competitors. When the store density goes beyond 0:11 per thousand people, however, the chain may want to switch to developing its outlets in a new market, because of the business-stealing e¤ects within a chain ("cannibalization").
With a better understanding of this trade-o¤, managers should be in a better position to yield higher revenues. Note that the density of outlets is directly related to the two following marketing variables: product line and distribution in the retail setting. First, because the number of outlets in a geographical space corresponds to the number of product lines in a product space, one may use the outlet density as a measure of how the product line is proliferated in retail and service sectors.
Second, as Section 2.1 describes, one may use the density of outlets as a measure that researches use to approximate the degree of distribution.
Second, the positive e¤ect of the density of outlets on individual store sales suggests another use of corporate outlets for retailers. The results imply the higher density of outlets, not the entry order per se, increases the store-level sales performance, especially when the outlet density is at a low level. Corporate-owned outlets may also be helpful in achieving higher sales per outlet via exposure e¤ects when the chain has just entered the market.
Conclusions
An investigation of entry order on performance is important to marketing, economics, and strategic management. Consequently, a sizable literature has grown around entry-order e¤ects on market shares and pro…ts, both theoretically and empirically. However, little is known about whether distribution, which a¤ects market shares, helps us better understand the entry-order e¤ects.
This paper examines the entry-order e¤ects on …rms' performance, with an emphasis on the geographical expansion of distribution. Recognizing that retail and service industries are characterized by their physical outlets, this paper documents and decomposes the market-share advantage into outlet-share and per-outlet-sales advantages. Using the manually collected panel information on store counts, sales, and entry timing of the convenience-store industry in Japan for each of 47 distinct geographic markets between 1991 through 2007, this article documents that for a given market, the …rst entrant would obtain a higher market share than non-…rst entrants. This paper …nds a strong role of distribution in market-share advantage, which is qualitatively consistent with the sequential-move preemption games. This paper also …nds a non-linear relationship between sales performance at the store level and distribution, suggesting a trade-o¤ between business-stealing from own-chain outlets ("cannibalization") and a repetition e¤ect through repeated exposures. This paper blends cross-sectional survey data on chain-brand preference with the historical entrytiming information to con…rm the interpretation of the baseline results. The empirical evidence is robust to several alternative speci…cations.
This paper's empirical …ndings are based on the data regarding geographical entry in the convenience-store industry in Japan, but extending the decomposition analysis beyond (1) entry in geographical space and (2) a single industry in a single country would be interesting. First, a researcher may be interested in applying the market-share decompositions beyond entry in geographical space. For instance, a researcher could alternatively focus on the spatial preemption in the product space, such as product proliferation in a ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry discussed in Schmalensee (1978) , such that a researcher is able to measure and decompose the entry-order e¤ects on market shares into the entry-order e¤ects on the number of products and sales per product. Second, spatial preemption in geographical space is ubiquitous, and one may apply this market-share decomposition where spatial preemption is a key component behind changes in market structure and rapid expansion. Some evidence of such spatial preemption matters includes a study on the supermarket industry (West 1981) . Because store counts and location data, current and historic, are mostly publicly observable for many retail and service sectors, extending the decomposition approach to rapid expansion and geographical preemption in other industries, such as the US premium-ice-cream industry (Murphy 2006) , may prove useful. Table 2 Entry Order Note: The sum of first entrants, 51, exceeds the total number of markets (=47), because there were some "ties." Namely, some chains entered a market in the same year. 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2007 . The per-outlet sales are daily sales in US dollars. Summary statistics for years since entry are limited to the the year-chain-prefecture combinations with no missing market-share information. I exclude observations with no outlet in a given prefecture. Table 5 The Decomposition of the Entry-Order Effects, 1991 -2007 Note: The instrumental variable for the first-entrant indicator variable is the log geographical distance to the headquarters of the chain's largest shareholding company. The data years are 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2007 . A prefecture constitutes a market. Standard errors reported in parentheses are based on two-tail t-tests for parameter estimates. I cluster the standard errors on the panel identifier (i.e., a market-chain combination). All specifications include market fixed effects. For purposes of exposition, the table suppresses the intercept and market fixed effects. (**)significant at the 1% level. (*)significant at the 5% level. (+)significant at the 10% level. The number of observations is 806.
(1)
(2)
(3) Table 6 The Entry-Order Effects on Outlet-level Sales, 1991 -2007 Note: The instrumental variable for the first-entrant indicator variable is the log geographical distance to the headquarters of the chain's largest shareholding company. The data years are 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2007 . A prefecture constitutes a market. Density of own outlets is the number of outlets of the same chain in market m in year t divided by the population in market m in year t. Density of competitors' outlets is defined similarly. For purposes of exposition, the table suppresses the intercept, year fixed effects, and chainbrand fixed effects. The number of observations is 784. Standard errors reported in parentheses are based on 2tail t-tests for parameter estimates. I cluster the standard errors on the panel identifier (i.e., a market-chain combination). (**)significant at the 1% level. (*)significant at the 5% level. (+)significant at the 10% level.
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Note: A unit of observation is a chain-region combination. The data contain 10 regions. The dependent variable is the percentage of people who voted for chain i in region r in 2005 and 2010. The survey in 2005 asked, "What is your favorite convenience-store chain (Pick one)?" The 2005 survey did not include circleK in the choice set of convenience-store chains. The survey in 2010 asked, "Which convenience-store chain do you like the most?" Standard errors reported in parentheses are based on two-tail t-tests for parameter estimates. For purposes of exposition, the table suppresses the intercept and chain-brand fixed ffects. (**)significant at the 1% level. (*)significant at the 5% level. (+)significant at the 10% level.
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (1) is the log of the average number of residents at the 1km-meshgrid level across outlets of chain i in market m in 2001. The dependent variable in column (2) 
